Mathematical model of performance measurement of defined contribution pension funds by Kelekele, Liloo Didier Joel
A mathematical model of performance measurement
of dened contribution pension funds
KELEKELE LILOO Didier Joel
A mini-thesis submitted in partial fullment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science (Computational Finance),
Supervisor: Prof P.J. Witbooi
University of the Western Cape,
Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics,
South Africa.
February 18, 2015
 
 
 
 
Declaration
I declare that this is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or
examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have
been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.
Kelekele Liloo Didier Joel. February, 2015
Signed: ....................
i
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my Saviour and Lord Jesus for rendering it possible to complete
this programme; albeit with many diculties we have endured in the process. A special
thanks goes to the Professor Peter Witbooi who have accepted to supervise this mini-
thesis. I would also like to thank all my family, parents and siblings, my ancee Ruth
Lumu Nsase, my pastor and fellow brethren in Christ and my fellow students who have
been supportive. May you all nd my heartfelt gratitude. A special thought goes to Felly
Ilunga Bitokuela, a soldier who has fallen on the eld of battle so early.
ii
 
 
 
 
Key words
Performance measurement, asset allocations, dened contribution, dened
benet, minimum guarantee, sharing rule, pension products, stochastic con-
trol, martingale, Brownian motion, power utility, growth optimal portfolio,
benchmark function, sensitivity analysis.
iii
 
 
 
 
Abstract
The industry of pension funds has become one of the drivers of today's economic activity
by its important volume of contribution in the nancial market and by creating wealth.
The increasing importance that pension funds have acquired in today's economy and -
nancial market, raises special attention from investors, nancial actors and pundits in
the sector. Regarding this economic weight of pension funds, a thorough analysis of the
performance of dierent pension funds plans in order to optimise benets need to be un-
dertaken. The research explores criteria and invariants that make it possible to compare
the performance of dierent pension fund products. Pension fund companies currently
do measure their performances with those of others. Likewise, the individual investing
in a pension plan compares dierent products available in the market. There exist dif-
ferent ways of measuring the performance of a pension fund according to their dierent
schemes. Generally, there exist two main pension funds plans. The dened benet (DB)
pension funds plan which is mostly preferred by pension members due to his ability to
hold the risk to the pension fund manager. The dened contributions (DC) pension fund
plan on the other hand, is more popularly preferred by the pension fund managers due
to its ability to transfer the risk to the pension fund members. One of the reasons that
motivate pension fund members' choices of entering into a certain programme is that their
expectations of maintaining their living lifestyle after retirement are met by the pension
fund strategies. This dissertation investigates the various properties and characteristics
of the dened contribution pension fund plan with a minimum guarantee and benchmark
in order to mitigate the risk that pension fund members are subject to. For the pension
fund manager the aim is to nd the optimal asset allocation strategy which optimises its
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retribution which is in fact a part of the surplus (the dierence between the the pension
fund value and the guarantee) (2004) [19] and to analyse the eect of sharing between
the contributor and the pension fund. From the pension fund members' perspective it is
to dene a optimal guarantee as a solution to the contributor's optimisation programme.
In particular, we consider a case of a pension fund company which invests in a bond,
stocks and a money market account. The uncertainty in the nancial market is driven
by Brownian motions. Numerical simulations were performed to compare the dierent
models.
Kelekele Liloo Didier Joel
MSc Thesis, Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, University of the
Western Cape.
February 2015.
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Chapter 1
General introduction
1.1 Introduction
The need for assessing the performance of pension fund managers or investment managers
has become imperative, in view of the large amounts of funds that pension managers are
handling, and the scale of competition this market is facing. From the investor's point of
view the need is even more serious when one considers the increasing volatility that the
nancial market is subjected to. Consider the global nancial crisis of 2008, the scandal
of the banking system of 2009, the Eurozone crisis of 2010 and all the economic turmoil
that have been daily reported to the media and news feeds. These events underline
the importance, so paramount, of improving the management of nancial institutions,
even more so of mutual funds, when taking into account their social and economic value
and impact. The management of mutual funds such as in pension schemes is so complex,
requiring some high level of skill and sophistication. Pension funds managers and investors
are aware of the above problems and they are concerned to know the performance of
dierent pension fund schemes that are available in the nancial market. To analyse
and assess the performance of nancial institutions in general and specically those of
mutual funds, some practitioners and pundits on the nancial eld has laid down some
methods and practices. The literature engaging the management of investment strategies
1
 
 
 
 
of pension funds is prolic and present methodologically two approaches:
 The stochastic control method.
This method was pioneered by Merton (1969,1971) [48] [49]. The stochastic method-
ology is mainly based on solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation com-
ing from the dynamic programming under the real world probability measure. Sev-
eral authors have laid down theories related to the stochastic control approach. For
instance, Vigna and Haberman (2001) [56] used stochastic dynamic programming to
analyse the nancial risk in a dened contribution (DC) pension scheme under Gaus-
sian interest rate models. They attempted to nd an optimal investment strategy,
given a nal target linked to the net replacement ratio and a set of interim targets.
Haberman and Vigna (2002) [32] extended their paper of earlier to study the in-
vestment allocation in a DC scheme whose fund is invested in several assets, and
considered three dierent risk measures to analyse the nal net replacement ratios.
Devolder et al (2003) [20] studied the management of an annuity contract under
an interest rate model described by a geometric Brownian motion. Menoncin and
Scaillet (2006) [51] provided the same exercise for a life annuity contract. Xiao et al
(2007) [58] applied the constant elasticity of variance model to an annuity contract
and derived the dual solution for the logarithm utility via the Legendre transform.
However, these studies generally suppose the short rate to be a constant. As the
contribution period in a pension plan is very long, generally from 20 to 40 years,
the assumption of constant rates is then dicult to accept in the eld of DC plans
(see Gao 2008) [27].
 The second approach, is the martingale method.
It aims generally to calculate an expectation under a risk-neutral measure. This
method was rst developed by Cox and Huang (1989) [16] in the setting of complete
markets and relies on the theory of Lagrange multipliers. In the last few years, it was
successfully applied by other authors such as Boulier et al (2001) [7] and Deelstra
et al (2003, 2004) [18] [19] to study the optimal design and asset allocation of a
2
 
 
 
 
pension plan. Recently, Hainaut and Devolder (2006) [33] analysed the dividend
policy and asset allocation of a pension fund under the Vasicek interest model.
While a pension fund manager are called to use these dierent methods to produce high
returns in the management of assets, one can question the true degree of performance these
funds managers achieve. When a pension member enters a pension programme, his or her
expectation is that the mutual fund will be able to keep safe his wealth and to increase
it in some extent. Because guided by the axiom of non-satiation, which claims that \plus
is preferred to minus" the pension fund member is expected to steer the investment to
yield results that can allow him to continue living the lifestyle he is used to. One of the
instruments of measuring the level of lifestyle is the individual income. The investment
manager is called to make optimal asset allocation which can yield outcomes that are
close to the level of the pension member's income just prior to retirement.
1.2 Research Problem
The dened contribution pension fund plan has gained important consideration in the in-
vestment portfolio management in the last two decades. Some practitioners of the world
of nance have been paying attention to the maintenance of lifestyle of the pension fund
member as the main motivation guiding their choice of dierent investment products avail-
able in the nancial market and thus the presence of some guarantee in order to mitigate
the risk exposure of pension fund members. Authors such as Boulier et al [7] considers
the Vasicek model for the interest rate and have presented a minimum guarantee in the
form of deterministic process. Deelstra et al (2003) [18] considers stochastic dynamics for
the interest rate, covering as a special case of the Vasicek model and of the Cox-Ingersoll-
Ross model. Their method considers a stochastic minimum guarantee to the worker at
retirement plus a fraction of the surplus (the dierence between the nal wealth and the
minimum guarantee). The same authors, in Deelstra et al (2004) [19], present a model
with various choices of guarantees that are available to the pension members. The main
objective of the present study is to analyse the dened contribution pension fund model
3
 
 
 
 
with a minimum stochastic guarantee serving as a benchmark and a sharing rule between
the fund manager and the pension fund member.
1.3 Research Objectives
The present research attempts to nd an optimal guarantee for a DC pension fund plan
subject to a sharing rule between the fund members and the fund manager. Thus the
objective is then to maximise a certain expected utility of the portfolio manager from his
part of the surplus; and the determination of the optimal sharing rule between the fund
manager and the pension fund member. The structure of the objective function in the
present research is widely used in the investment management literature; the model being
used in the present research assumes that the parameters are time varying. The objective
function depends on a risky asset, riskless asset, the zero coupon bond and the guarantee.
1.4 Structure
The present dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter two discusses the dierent types
of pension fund plan. The third chapter present the mathematical model of the dened
contribution (DC) pension fund. The fourth chapter presents the pension fund model
with benchmark under the framework of Browne (1999) [10] with the introduction of the
sharing rule and the growth optimal portfolio (GOP). The fth chapter gives a conclusion.
4
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2
Dierent types of pension fund
schemes
The present chapter reviews dierent types of pension fund schemes that are available in
the market. It revisit the theoretical foundation of the two main pension fund schemes,
which are the dened benet (DB) and the dened contribution (DC). The main reference
of the chapter are the researches of Bodie et al (1988) [6], Boulier et al (1995) [8] , Andrew
Cairns (2000) [11], Andrew Cairns (2003) [12] and Cairns et al (2000) [13] . The chapter
discusses how the DB and the DC pension fund schemes have evolved in years and how
they have been adapted.
2.1 The dened benet plan
The dened benet (DB) schemes can be viewed as a plan where the employees' pension
benet entitlement is determined by a formula which takes into account years of service
for the employer and, in most cases, wages or salary. Many dened benet formulas also
take into account the Social Security benets to which an employee is entitled. These
are the so-called integrated plans (1988) [6]. The dened benet pension sheme can be
analysed in many ways. In what follows we briey review the dierent mathematical
approaches to DB plans.
5
 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Deterministic methods
A process is called deterministic if its value as a function of time can be pre-determined
at a given time. We are presenting in this paragraph a simple discrete time deterministic
model of a pension fund, which aims to build a pension that will be in step with the nal
salary at retirement. The model features in the paper of Cairns (2003) [12] and it has the
following assumptions:
 Salaries are increased each year in line with a cost-of-living index CLI(t).
 At the start of the year [t; t+ 1), one new member joins the scheme at age 25, with
a salary of 10000 CLI(t)=CLI(0 ).
 All members stay with the scheme until age 65 and mortality before age 65 is
assumed to be zero.
 At age 65 the member retires and receives a pension equal to a fraction of the nal
salary for each year as a member of the scheme, payable annually in advance for
life. This pension is secured by the pension fund member purchasing an annuity
from a life insurer in order to secure his pension and the pension fund has no further
responsibility such as making payments to the member. The nal salary is dened
as the salary rate at age 65 including the cost-of-living salary increase at age 65.
 Salaries are increased at the start of each year and include a combination of age-
related and cost-of-living increases.
Let S(t; x) represent the salary at time t for a member aged x at that time. The scheme
structure described above indicates that
S(t+ 1; x) = S(t; x) w(x+ 1)
w(x)
 CLI(t + 1 )
CLI(t)
(2.1)
where the function w(x) is called the wage prole and determines age-related increases.
Initially it is assumed that S(0; x) = 10000w(x)=w(25) for x= 25; ::::; 65; and it follows
that we have the identity:
6
 
 
 
 
S(t; x) = S(0; x)
CLI(t)
CLI(0 )
(2.2)
In this equation, we nd that the actuary has a twofold traditional role : Firstly, the
actuary must determine the actuarial liability at time t which is then compared with the
value of the assets. Secondly, the actuary must recommend a contribution rate. There are
dierent approaches for responding to these two questions. We present two of the most
popular methods in this regard.
 The rst one is the Entry Age Method approach. This approach has emerged in
the UK. The method regards the contract as a life insurance policy and poses the
question of : what contribution rate (as a percentage of salary) should a new member
pay throughout his career in order to have the right amount of cash available at age
65 to buy the promised pension? The answer to this question is what paves the way
to calculate the fund overall liability [12].
 The second approach is the Projected Unit Method. It is rstly based on the
calculation of the actuarial liability. In this method only the contribution of fund
accrued to date is valued and the method does not make any allowance for benets
arising from continued service in the future. The valuation also takes into account
projected future salary increases (age-related and cost-of-living). In this case the
actuarial liability at time t is
AL(t) =
64X
x=25
x   25
60

S (t ; x )
w(65 )
w(x )
(1 + ")65 x

v65 x65 +
40
60
S (t ; 65 )65 (2.3)
In this equation " represents the assumed rate of growth of CLI(t); (v = 1=(1 + i))
where i is the valuation rate of interest and 65 is the assumed price for a unit of
pension from age 65. It is generally known that pensions are bought out at age
65. The component of AL(t) of the equation (2.3) represents the liability for the
member who has just attained age 65 but for whom a pension has not yet been
7
 
 
 
 
purchased. The incorporation of some decrements such as mortality, ill-health re-
tirement, resignation from the company before the age of 65 and benets coming
along with such as early exits are often seen as not appropriate. Since salaries at
each constant age x increase each year in line with CLI(t), we note that:
AL(t + 1 ) = AL(t)CLI(t + 1 )=CLI(t):
Having assets equal to liabilities at time t and at the time t+ 1, the normal contri-
bution rate of the pension fund member, NC(t), payable at time t encompasses the
following elements:
{ the sponsor pays in NC(t) times the total salary roll at t,
TSR(t) =
65X
i=25
S (t ; x ); (2.4)
{ the pension-fund trustees immediately secure the purchase of a pension (for a
price B(t)) for the member who has just attained age 65;
With experience suggesting that anticipation in the valuation basis of investment return,
the increase of salary at time t + 1 and no deaths occurring before time t + 1, this gives
the following:
(AL(t) + NC(t)TSR(t)  B(t)) (1 + i) = AL(t)(1 + "): (2.5)
This means that
NC(t) = (B(t)  AL(t)(1   ))=TSR(t) (2.6)
where  = (1 + ")=(1 + i) is the assumed real discount factor. The remaining element
of a funding valuation is the recommendation of a contribution rate and NC(t) is only
appropriate if assets equal liabilities. This leads us to the concept of amortisation of
surplus or decit. Let F (t) represent the fund size at time t, so that the decit on the
funding basis is AL(t)-F (t) The recommended contribution rate is
RCR(t) = NC(t) +

AL(t)  F (t)
TSR(t)

(2.7)
8
 
 
 
 
where
 =
 1X
k=0
k =
1  
1   (2.8)
The constant  is the amortisation period. This could be set according to how rapidly
the fund sponsor wants to get rid of surplus or decit. Often, though, it is set equal to the
expected future working lifetime of the active membership, in line with certain accounting
guidelines. A related approach to amortisation is mostly used in North America. The
adjustment is divided into  components which are each relating to the amortisation of
the surplus or decit arising in each of the last  years. Additionally, there may be a
corridor around the actuarial liability within which surplus or decit is not amortised.
Both of these dierences, in comparison to the UK approach, lead to a greater volatility
in contribution rates [12].
2.1.2 Dufresne method
Early work on the stochastic methods was conducted by Dufresne in a series of papers
(Dufresne, 1988, 1989, 1990) [22] [23] [24]. Dufresne took the series of actuarial liabilities,
AL(n) as given. The valuation method and basis were assumed to be given too; these
assumptions were later relaxed by the work of other authors such as Haberman [30]
and it was found that the original conclusions remained broadly intact. In particular, all
elements of the basis were best estimates of the relevant quantities. The method developed
by Dufresne is seen as a precursor of the stochastic method which became widely used in
nance literature and research. In Dufresne's method the focus is more on the dynamics
of the fund size and the contribution rate,
F (t + 1 ) = (1 + i(t + 1 ))[F (t) + RCR(t)TSR(t)  B(t)]; (2.9)
Where i(t + 1 ) is the achieved return on the fund from time t to time t+ 1, and
RCR(t) = NC(t) +

AL(t)  F(t)
TSR(t)

: (2.10)
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Simple models for i(t) allow us to derive analytical (or semi-analytical) formulas for the
unconditional mean and variance of both F (t) and RCR(t). The key feature of these
investigations is the assessment of how these values depend upon the amortisation period
. It is found that if  is too large (typically greater than 10 years) then the amortisation
strategy will be inecient: a lower value for  would reduce the variance of both the fund
size and the contribution rate. Below a certain threshold for , however, there would be
a trade-o between continued reductions in Var[F (t)] and an increasing Var[RCR(t)].
2.1.3 Other stochastic methods
Cairns and Parker (1997) [15] and Huang(2000) [36] are among those who have made
some of further advances in the Dufresne method to make it more sophisticated. In
the earlier works the only control variable was the amortisation period [11]. Cairns and
Parker extended this to include the valuation rate of interest, while Huang extended it
furthermore to include the asset strategy as a control variable. They all found that having
a valuation rate of interest dierent from E[i(t)] enriched the analysis. This meant that
the decision process now had to take into account the mean contribution rate as well as
the variances. Cairns and Parker also conducted a comprehensive sensitivity analysis with
respect to various model parameters and took a close look at conditional, in addition to
unconditional means and variances with nite time horizons.
Up to this point the decision-making process was still relatively subjective. There was
no formal objective which would result in the emergence of one specic strategy out of the
range of ecient strategies. Then came the introduction of stochastic control theory as
a means of assisting in the decision making process. This approach has been taken using
both continuous time modeling [8] and [11] and discrete time, Haberman and Sung (1994)
[31]. The former approach yields some stronger results. Once the objective function has
been specied, dynamic stochastic control theory identies the dynamic control strategy
which is optimal at all times in the future and in all possible future states of the world.
This is in contrast to the previous approach where a limited range of controls might
10
 
 
 
 
be considered and which might only result in the identication of a strategy which is
optimal for only one state of the world. In stochastic control there is no automatic
requirement to conduct actuarial valuations or set contribution rates with respect to a
normal contribution rate augmented by rigid amortisation guidelines. The use of a clean
sheet and the formulation of an objective function which takes into account the interests
of the various stakeholders in the pension fund has been used. As Cairns [11] proposed,
let the fund size F (t) at time t and the corresponding contribution rate C(t) be governed
by the stochastic dierential equation,
dF (t) = F (t)
h
(d(t) + C(t) B)dt+ dZ(t)
i
: (2.11)
Where: F (t) is the fund size, d(t) is the return on asset between t and t+ dt, C(t) is the
contribution rate, B is the expected rate of benet,  is the volatility.
This equation assumes that the outgo benet has a constant mean with uctuations
around the mean to account for demographic and other uncertainty in the benet pay-
ments. The rst element in (2.11) gives us the instantaneous investment gain on the fund
from t to t+ dt. The d(t) term represents the instantaneous gain per unit invested and
contains the usual mixture of drift (dt) and Brownian motion dZ(t) terms. The second
element represents the contributions paid in by the fund sponsor. The third term in
brackets represents the outgo benet [8] and [11] assumes that both the contribution rate,
C(t), and the possibly dynamic asset-allocation strategy, p(t), are both control variables
which could be used to optimise the fund's objective function. The objective function is
similar to that introduced by Merton (1969, 1971,1990) [48] [49] [50] and can be described
as the discounted expected loss function:
(t; f)(C; p) = E
h Z 1
t
e 
s
L(s; (C); F (s))dsjF (t)
i
: (2.12)
Following Boulier et al (1995) [8], L(s; C; F (s)) is the loss function, C(t) is the contri-
bution rate and P (t) is the pension payement.
From the current fund size F (t) = f the expected discounted loss depends on the choice
of control strategies C and p. These strategies depend upon the time of application,
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s, in the future as well as the state of the market at that time (that is, F (s)). The
function L(t; c; f) is a loss function which measures how unhappy (in a collective sense)
the stakeholders are about what is happening at time s given that F (s) = f and that the
contribution rate will be C(s) = C. The discount function e s determines the relative
weight attached to outcomes at various points in the future: for example, a large value
of  will place more emphasis on the short term. The aim of the exercise is then to
determine what strategies C and p will minimise (t;f)(C; p). Thus the programme is
V (t; f) = inf
C;s
(t;f)(C; p): (2.13)
It is well known that problems of this type V (t; f) can be solved using the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) as some authors have stipulated Fleming and Rishel,
(1975) [26], Korn, (1997) [42], or Bjork, (1998) [4] and Cairns [11]. The HJB is used for
determing the optimal contribution and asset strategies. Cairns has analysed examples
where the loss function is quadratic in C and f as well as power and exponential loss in C
only. These led to some interesting conclusions about the optimal C and p. Some of these
were intuitively sensible but others were less so and this could be connected to aspects of
the original loss function. Cairns concluded that alternative loss functions needed to be
developed to address these problems [11].
2.2 The Dened Contribution plan
A dened contribution (DC) scheme is a plan whereby each employee has an account
into which the employer and, if it is a contributory plan, the employee make regular
contributions. Benet levels depend on the total contributions and investment earnings
of the accumulation in the account. Often, the employee has some choice regarding the
type of assets in which the accumulation is invested and can easily monitor its value at
any time. Dened contribution plans are, in eect, tax deferred savings accounts in trust
for the employees, and they are by denition fully funded, Bodie et al [6].
Mathematically, the dened contribution plan is characterized by the way it operates.
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The dened contribution pensions fund plan operates quite dierently from the dened
benet pensions fund plan. In the latter case the company sponsoring the fund usually
takes on the majority of risk, especially investment risk. In a DC pension fund the
individual members take on all of the risk. In a typical occupational DC pension fund the
contribution rate payable by both the member and the employer is a xed percentage of
the salary. This is invested in a variety of managed funds with some control over the choice
of funds in the hands of the member. The result is that there is considerable uncertainty
over the amount of pension that might be achieved at the time of retirement. Again this is
in contrast to a DB pension which delivers a well-dened level of pension. A DC pension
plan is a personal pension which oers additional exibility over occupational schemes
through variation of the contribution rate. This means that a pension fund member
might choose to pay more if their pension fund investments have not been performing
very well.
2.2.1 Deterministic projection method
This method has emerged since 2003 in the UK, the approach requires that at the point
of sale of a personal pension policy, the insurer is compelled to provide to the potential
policyholder some deterministic projections to help their decision making with regard to
their contribution rate. This is used as means to present some guarantees to pensions fund
members. There is not any formal requirement for actuarial or other advice to help DC
fund members to choose how to invest or what level of contributions they should pay, but
existing DC pension fund members (personal pension policyholders and occupational fund
members) may be provided with deterministic projections. This lamentable situation has
left DC fund members largely ignorant. about the risk that they are exposed to. So the
present situation is that they just have to accept the risks that face them. However, the
growing use of stochastic methods in DB pension funds has spawned similar work in DC
pensions funds.
For a DC pensions funds the aim of a stochastic modeling is to:
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 Inform existing members of the potential risks that they face if they continue with
their present strategy;
 Inform potential new DC fund members or new personal pension policy holders of
the risks that they face, to allow them to choose between the DC pension funds and
some alternatives;
 Allow existing members to manage the risks that they face by choosing an invest-
ment and a contribution strategy which is consistent with their appetite for risk and
with the current status of their personal DC-pension account;
 Allow members to adopt a strategy which will, with high probability, permit them
to retire by a certain age with a comfortable level of pension.
Let us look at occupational DC pension funds, where the contribution rate is a xed
percentage of salary. This type of scheme has been analysed extensively by Cairns et al
(2001) [13], Haberman and Vigna (2002) [32] and Cairns et al (2003) [14] and (2001) [13],
and the authors have looked at the problem in discrete time from an empirical point of
view. The fund dynamics are
F (t+ 1) = (1 + i(t+ 1))(F (t) + C(t)); (2.14)
Where the annual contribution C(t) = k  S(t) is a xed proportion k of the member's
current salary S(t), and i(t+ 1) is the investment return for the period from t to t+ 1.
The pension ratio (PR) represented by the equation (2.15) encompasses the following
elements:
 The salary process which is stochastic and is correlated with investment returns,
 The time of retirement T ,
 The fund size F (T ),
 The Market price or rate a(T ), which depends primarily on long-term interest rates
at time T but could also incorporate changes in mortality expectations,
14
 
 
 
 
 The DB benchmark ratio which is the two-thirds of nal salary.
When the time of retirement is for instance 65 the pension ratio (PR) is then given by
the equation (2.15) here below with PEN(T ) being the pension payement at time T .
PR(T ) =
PEN(T )
2
3
S (T )
=
3F (T )
2a65 (T )S (T )
(2.15)
A variety of investment strategies which are commonly used in practice and oered by
pension funds and pension providers have been investigated by Cairns et al [14] They have
considered a variety of dierent models for investment returns on 6 asset classes in order
to assess the extent of model risk. They conclude that if the models are all calibrated
to the same historical data set then dierences between models are relatively small when
compared with the dierences which arise as a result of adopting dierent investment
strategies. They have used the model to generate by simulation the distribution of the
pension ratio at retirement for each investment strategy and their empirical analysis was
simple to avoid the relative complexity of the individual asset models. This then allows
users to compare strategies using a variety of dierent measures of risk although Cairns
et al [13] have concentrated their analysis on Value at Risk measures. They conclude that
some of the more sophisticated strategies such as the lifestyle strategy, which is popular
with insurers, do not deliver superior performance over the long period of the contract.
Instead they found that a static strategy with a high equity content is likely to be best
for all but the most risk-averse policyholders (2001, 2003) [13] [14]. Haberman and Vigna
(2002) [32] also consider a discrete-time model as in equation (2.14) but restrict themselves
to a xed contribution rate in monetary terms, in a framework which is consistent with
constant salary over the working lifetime of the policyholder. They use a simpler model
for investment returns and this allows them to conduct a more rigorous analysis using
stochastic control with quadratic or mean-shortfall loss functions.
2.2.2 Stochastic projection method
Cairns et al (2001, 2003) [13] [14] formulate the DC pension problem in continuous time.
Their aim was to tackle the same problem as in their paper (2001) [13] with the require-
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ment to optimise the expected value of a terminal utility function. This requires a simpler
model (multivariate geometric Brownian motion) than before for asset values and salary
growth but also includes a full, arbitrage-free model for the term structure of interest rates
which allowed them to calculate accurately the price of the annuity at time T . Terminal
utility is assumed to be of the power-utility form
1

PR(T ) (2.16)
for  <1 and  6= 0. Cairns et al [14] et al apply the same HJB technology as used
by Cairns [11] in tackling the DB pension problem to determine the optimal dynamic
asset-allocation strategy for the policy holder with a given level of risk aversion. A crucial
feature of the DC pension policy is that the policyholder needs to take into account
future contributions. The result of this feature is that the optimal strategy should vary
signicantly over time, starting with a high proportion in high-return-high-risk assets,
gradually reducing to a mixed portfolio consistent with their degree of risk aversion.
They found that the optimal strategy depends signicantly on the current fund size. This
is then compared with a variety of static and deterministic but dynamic asset allocation
strategies, and they concluded that the optimal stochastic strategy delivers a signicantly
higher expected terminal utility.
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Chapter 3
Mathematical model of a DC
pension fund with minimum
guarantee and sharing rule
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we lay down the mathematical model of the dened contribution pension
fund with minimum guarantee. The main references for this chapter are the papers
Federico (2008) [25], Gozzi et al (2011) [21], Deelstra et al (2003) [18] and Deelstra et al
(2004) [19]. The model under analysis assumes a complete market and in a continuous
time. Essentially we assume the following for our model:
 Competitiveness: assume that the investor's behaviour is to optimise its utility
function and the time horizon.
 Frictionless: assume that all the assets are perfectly divisible and there exist no
transaction costs or taxes.
 Arbitrage free: any gain opportunity is assumed with positive risk probability.
 Default free: nancial institutions issuing assets are no-defaulting.
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 Continuously open: investors can continuously trade in the market.
The research supposes that the pension fund wealth must be above a suitable positive
function which is the solvency level. Also assumed is a demographic stationary hypothesis,
which states that the ow of people who enter into the fund starts at time t = 0 and is
constant over time and that there is an exogenous constant T  0 which is the time
during which the members adhere to the pension fund. Therefore the exit ow of people
is null in the interval [0;T ] and is constant after time T , balancing exactly the entrance
ow. Gozzi et al (2011) [21].
3.2 The model
The model under analysis encompasses four dierent elements, which are the wealth,
the contributions, the benets and the solvency level. As per Gozziet al (2011) [21] the
analysis is made to see how the combination of the dierent elements drives the model
behaviour.
3.2.1 The dynamic of wealth
The mathematical model is set up by considering a complete probability space (
;F ;P)
with a ltration fFtgt0, where t  0 is the time variable. The ltration fFtgt0 describes
the information structure of the model. It is generated by the trajectories of a one-
dimensional standard Brownian motion B(t), t  0, dened on the same probability
space and completed with the addition of the null measure sets of F . The nancial
market is composed of two kinds of assets: a riskless asset and risky assets. The price of
the riskless asset S0(t); t  0, evolves according to the equation:
8<: S0(t) = rS0(t)dt;S0(0) = 1: (3.1)
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where r  0 is the instantaneous spot rate of return. The price S(t), t  0, of the risky
assets follows an Ito^ process and satises the stochastic dierential equation
8<: dSi(t) = iSi(t)dt+ iSi(t)dB(t);Si(0) = si0: (3.2)
Where i = 1; 2; 3; :::; n,  is the instantaneous rate of expected return and  > 0 is the
instantaneous rate of volatility. We assume that the market assigns a premium for the
risky investment, i.e.  > r. The drift  can also be expressed by the relation  = r+;
where  > 0 is the instantaneous risk premium of the market, i.e., the price that the
market assigns to the randomness expressed by the standard Brownian motion B(:). The
value of  is assumed to be positive and   r. The interest rate is stochastic in line with
the works of Boulier et al (2001) [7], Deelstra et al (2003) [18], Cairns et al (2000) [13],
but with a solvency constraint introduced this time.
The state variable, represented by X(t), t  0, is the fFtgt0 -adapted process that gives
the amount of the pension fund wealth at any time. It is supposed that the pension fund
starts its activity at the date t = 0 and at this time it owns a starting amount of wealth
X0  0. There is a control variable, denoted by (t), t  0 , which is the fFtgt0 adapted
process that represents the proportion of fund wealth invested in the risky assets. The
positivity of the wealth is due to the solvency constraints and the borrowing and short
selling constraints determines the choice of (t)2 [0, 1] for every t. Thus the dynamics of
wealth is formally expressed by the following state equation:
8<: dX(t) =
(t)X(t)Pn
i=1 S
i(t)
dSi(t) + [1 (t)]X(t)
S0(t)
dS0(t) + c(t)dt  b(t)dt; t  0
X(0) = x0  0:
(3.3)
Where (t)X(t)
Si(t)
and [1 (t)]X(t)
S0(t)
are the quantities in the portfolio of risky and riskless as-
sets, respectively, while the non-negative integrable function c(t), indicates the ow of
contributions and the non-negative function b(t), represents the ow of benets.
19
 
 
 
 
Following the Ito^ representation, the equation (3.3) can be rewritten as:8<: dX(t) = [r + (t)X(t) + c(t)  b(t)]dt+ (t)X(t)dB(t); t  0X(0) = x  0: (3.4)
3.2.2 Contributions
In the context of this work we assume that the population is stationary, the ow of
contributions c(:) is exogenous. The present work assumes also that the workers who
enter into the pension fund are a homogeneous class, that is to say a class of people
having the same characteristics. We suppose that their entrance ow is constant over
time and that each participant adheres for a length of time represented by an exogenous
constant T > 0. We assume that there is a xed number N of fund members after time
T . The ow of aggregate contributions of pension members can be written such as:
c(t) =
t
T
N!: with 0  t  T (3.5)
Where  2 (0; 1) represents the average contribution rate (per time and per salary) and
W (t)  0 , t  0, the average per capita wage rate of the fund members. For simplicity
we take W (:) equal to a constant ! > 0.
3.2.3 The benet
The benet of the pension fund member is composed of the minimum guarantee a part
of the surplus of the contributions. By assuming the hypothesis of the demographic
stationarity, the function describing the minimum guarantee is as follows:
g(t) =
Z 
t0
c(u)e( u)du;   t0 (3.6)
Where  > 0 is the guaranteed rate of return, and with r  . This inequality is
actually justied by the fact that pension fund members are forced by law to delegate the
management of their funds to mutual fund institutions. Thus they cannot invest directly
into the nancial market. The process of investment delegation involves management
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costs which are paid by accepting a guaranteed rate of return  lower than the risk free
rate r. Due to the solvency level, as developed in the subsequent subsection, the pension
fund manager will always pay the benet which is the following:
b(t;X(:) j [t0;  ]) = g(t) + Y (t;X(:) j [t0;  ]); with   t0 : (3.7)
Here Y (:; :) the surplus, is a function depending on the time  and on the fund level within
the interval of time [t0;  ].
3.2.4 The solvency level
Generally the solvency level is imposed by law or by a supervisory authority to avoid
improper behavior of the fund manager and to guarantee that the mutual fund is able to
pay at least part of the due benets at any time t  0. Without the imposition of this
constraint the fund manager may be tempted to use strategies that may bring the mutual
fund to be mismatched with the social target of the pension fund. The solvency level l(:)
is a non-decreasing continuous function of time T and has the following equation:
l(t) = l0 + 
Z t
0
c(u)e(t u)du with t  0: (3.8)
This equation shows the following:
 At the beginning, the pension fund should hold a given minimum start-up level
which is l0  0:
 At any time t > 0 the solvency level is l0 plus a fraction  > 0 of the annual
contribution at time t capitalized at rate :
This implies that the value of the pension fund members benet would be almost surely
equal or superior to the current minimum guarantee.
From the equation (3.8) and (3.5) it gives the equation:
l(t) = l0 + N!
e(t)   1
T
; t  0: (3.9)
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3.3 The objective function
The objective function of a pension fund is usually dierent from that of other forms of
rms intervening directly into the nancial market. This is due mostly to the fact that
pension funds are subject to a certain number of restrictions from regulatory authorities
in order to enforce a guarantee for subscribers to obtain the promised benets. While
rms intervening directly into the nancial market are willing to optimise their welfare
by taking direct advantage from stock market opportunities, a pension fund subscription
is usually a process of investment delegation forced by the social security laws. It is
well known that the process of investment delegation involves costs for the contributors
and a potential divergence between the interests of the collectivity of subscribers and the
manager of the fund. In order to bring some incentive to the manager, it is common
practice to introduce a variable component in the management fee proportional to the
absolute level of funds wealth as shown by Goetzmann et al (2003) [29]. This is basically
to say that the optimization criterion for the management of a pension fund does take
into account two dierent points of view:
 The point of view of the pension fund members: the fund manager is directly
delegated by the members to invest in the risky market in order to generate their
benets and the function programme is proportional to contributions of pension
fund members.
 The point of view of the pension fund manager: the manager is led to invest in risky
assets in order to improve his fee, which is an increasing function of the absolute
level of the funds wealth.
In the following subsection the research looks at the aforementioned views and
translate them into a suitable optimisation programme.
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3.3.1 The optimisation programme of the contributor
The optimisation programme of the contributor is set such that the contributor pays a
ow to the pension fund which consists of a lump sum at date 0, denoted by X0 and a
continuously paid premium, at a rate denoted by c(t); t 2 [0; T ]. The ow of contributions
is assumed to be a non-negative, progressively measurable process such that:Z T
0
c2(t)dt <1; (3.10)
Let Ht be the deator price process and it is dened as:
Ht = exp( 
Z t
0
(rsds  
Z t
0
0sdWs  
1
2
Z t
0
jj0sjj2ds): (3.11)
The value of the cash given by the contributor to the pension fund at the date 0 is equal
to:
X 00 = X0 + E
h Z T
0
H(s)c(s)ds
i
: (3.12)
At time T the pension fund member will receive from the fund a certain benet which
encompasses two parts, the guarantee Gt and a certain fraction of the surplus Yt which
is equal to Xt  Gt. Following prior studies on the incentives of agents under a constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function, the model of surplus is linear (Holstrom
and Milgrom (1987) [35]). Thus the benet process will be
Bt = Gt + (1  )Yt; (3.13)
With :
 Yt = Xt  Gt is the surplus process,
 Gt is the guarantee.
In the hypothesis of a stochastic guarantee and with the other variables being constant,
one can ask where lies the optimal guarantee that gives the pension fund member a
desirable benet. The cases of  = 0 or  = 1 are trivial, and so will not be pursued in
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the present dissertation. Thus we will consider only 0 <  < 1.
The programme of the contributor amounts to nding
max

E[U(1  )Yt +Gt]Et
Z T
t
Hs
Ht
Csds

; (3.14)
subject to
8<: (1  )YtHt +Gt = k;Gt > 0: (3.15)
The solution of this programme will require to rst nd the characteristics of the surplus
process. Let Yt = Xt +Dt  Gt be the surplus process with t  0 and
Dt = Et
Z T
t
Hs
Ht
Csds; Gt = Et
Z T
t
Hs
Ht
Csds; (3.16)
Which gives,
Yt = Xt + Et
Z T
t
Hs
Ht
Csds  Et
Z T
t
Hs
Ht
Csds: (3.17)
The surplus process is in fact the value of the portfolio Xt plus the discounted value of the
future engagements coming from the pension fund member Dt and minus the discounted
value of the pension fund future engagement which is the guarantee Gt. The surplus
process is self nancing as dened by Karatzas and Shreve (1998) [39]. This means that
there exists a progressively measurable random process Yt = (y1t; :::; ynt)
0, t 2 [0; T ] such
that
dYt = Ytrtdt + y
0
t(bt   rt)dt + y0ttdWt; (3.18)
and the nal surplus process is such:
YT = Y0 exp(
Z T
0
(rt + y
0
t(bt   rt)dt+
Z T
0
y0ttdWt  
1
2
Z T
0
jjy0ttjj2dt); (3.19)
with
Y0 = X0 + E[
Z T
0
Hscsds]  E[HTGT ]  0: (3.20)
The value of YT has two parts; the deterministic part which is represented by Y0 and link
YT to GT and the random part which is represented by
	 = exp(
Z T
0
(rt + y
0
t(bt   rt)dt+
Z T
0
y0ttdWt  
1
2
Z T
0
jjy0ttjj2dt): (3.21)
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3.3.2 The optimisation programme of the pension fund manager
The present section describes the problem faced by the pension fund manager. He max-
imises the expected utility of his terminal wealth which is his part of the surplus. The form
of the pension fund manager function is of the type of power utility, U(Y ) = Y
1 
1  . The
choice of the power utility function is guided by the fact that the power utility presents
the characteristics that better capture the features of pension fund companies due to the
large scale of money they are managing. Pensions funds companies are regulated in such
a way as to not reach negatives values. The power utility function endorses this through
the innite marginal utility at zero [18].
Let Xt being the wealth of the fund at date t 2 [0; T ], and t the proportion of wealth
invested into the risky assets so that 1 Pni=1 t is the proportion of wealth invested into
the riskless asset p0(t): The optimisation programme of the pension fund will be
max
1
1  E(XT  GT )
1 ; (3.22)
subject to :
dXt = [Xtrt +Xt
0
t(bt   rt) + ct]dt+Xt0ttdWt; (3.23)
with X(0) = X0 > 0 and lets 
x = t = (1t; :::; nt)
0; t 2 [0; T ], being an Ft   adapted
process such that
R T
0
jjXt0ttjj2dt <1 and Xt  Gt  0.
The condition:
E[HTGT ] < X0 + E[
Z T
0
Htctdt] = X
0
0: (3.24)
shows that the market value of the contributions is larger than the market value of the
guarantee, and this condition guarantees the non emptiness of the set of admissible strate-
gies.
Ideas from the framework developed in this chapter will be used in the Browne's frame-
work, which constitute the main results of this dissertation and are developed in the
following chapter.
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Chapter 4
A dened contribution pension fund
scheme with benchmark
In this chapter, the research presents the portfolio proposed in the paper of Browne (1999)
[10] and it is attached to it a certain sharing rule, similarly as in the paper of Deelstra
et al (2004) [19]. The research analyses the impact of the dierent parameters on the
stochastic evolution of the model. Then it observes the performance of the investment
portfolio with respect to a certain benchmark which is also stochastic. Benchmarking
has been widely used in the pension fund literature and in practice. In this regard, see
for example the works of Lioui and Poncet (2013) [45], Gaivonronski et al (2005) [28],
Platen and Heath (2006) [34]. In the present case there is a guarantee that serves as a
benchmark. The portfolio manager has as goal to maximise his surplus, which is Xt Gt,
where Xt is the wealth process and Gt is the guarantee process. When the surplus is
positive, the fund manager is performing well and vice versa. As mentioned above, the
analysis of a benchmark function in the nancial literature has been prominent in recent
years. The notion has its roots in portfolio management theory. In portfolio management
there are two alternative approaches that managers of dierent assets management units
can use to run their activities. Those types are the passive portfolio management and the
active portfolio management.
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 The passive portfolio management is a nancial strategy in which a fund manager
invest in a predetermined manner which mostly consist of trying to replicate a
return of a certain benchmark which are mostly market indices. Once the portfolio
has been set, the manager does not alter it until maturity.
 The active portfolio management is a nancial strategy where the fund manager
makes a specic investment and continually changes it with the goal of outper-
forming the market represented by an investment benchmark index, see Bodie et al
(2004) [5] for instance.
Active portfolio management has gained considerable importance in nancial investment
practice, due to its ability to take advantage of the market ineciencies by using arbitrage.
As argued in Browne (1999) [10], active portfolio management may have many possible
objectives related to outperforming a benchmark, such as:
 the maximisation of the probability of beating the benchmark,
 the maximisation or (respectively) the minimisation of the expected time of beating
or (respectively) being beaten by the benchmark,
 the maximisation or the minimisation of the expected discounted rewards upon
beating or being beaten by the benchmark,
 the maximisation of terminal utility.
The above objectives are important for nancial institutions, especially those who are
managing portfolio funds, in the sense that their performances are judged with respect to
the return they realise against a certain benchmark.
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4.1 Analysis of the wealth process with respect to a
benchmark
In the present section, we are analysing the model that follows the framework of Browne
[10]. The wealth process given in the equation (5.4) below is composed of the following
processes :
 The risk free asset Bt evolves as:
dBt = rtBtdt; (4.1)
with r  0.
 The risky asset St under the ltered probability space (
;F;P) satises the stochas-
tic dierential equation:
dSit =
KX
i=1
Sit [idt+ idW
i
t ]; (4.2)
with i = 1; 2; 3; :::; K. In order to avoid any kind of triviality, we impose the
condition that i > rt for all i = 1; 2; 3; :::; K:
 The contribution from the pension fund member is Ct and from the equation (3.5)
it takes the following form:
dCt = N!tdt; (4.3)
Where, for some constant , N denotes the number of members in the pension fund,
and ! the ow of the salary.
The wealth process as in Browne takes the form:
dXt = Xt

(rt + 
0
t(t   rt) + ct)

dt+Xt
0
ttdWt: (4.4)
It entails the risky asset which is composed of stocks, the risk free asset which is a bond
and the contribution of pension fund members and where 0 is the vector of the investment
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policy of the portfolio.
The guarantee is assumed to be a stochastic process of the form :
dGt = Gtr
0
tdt +Gtt(bt   r0t)dt +GtttdWt: (4.5)
The research is interested in determining an investment strategy that is optimal with
respect to the performance against a certain benchmark. The benchmark that is presented
in this work is another stochastic process. Generally the benchmark can take many forms.
It might be an ination rate, or an exchange rate, it might also represent the value process
of a non-traded asset or even a wealth process from a dierent portfolio strategy. In the
present research a non-traded asset such as the guarantee serves as the benchmark. Then
the fund manager, in order for him to observe the performance of his fund against it, will
be interested in the ratio of the wealth process as compared to the guarantee process.
The ratio is Yt = Xt=Gt and it is as per Browne's notation [10], and its equation is of the
form:
dYt = Yt

(r^t + (tf^t + ct))dt + ttdWt:

(4.6)
Where : r^t = rt   r0t, t = 0t   t, f^t = bt   rt.
After presenting the benchmarking problem, there is the task analysing its optimality.
Thus the following section will treat issues relative to the portfolio optimisation.
4.2 The portfolio optimisation problem.
To nd the maximal expected terminal utility of the ratio process at some xed terminal
time T <1, we can either use the Hamilton - Jacobi - Bellman method or the martingale
method. The martingale method has been applied in the present research to nd the
expected values as per Rogers and Williams (1987)[53] or Davis and Norman (1990)[17].
It entails nding an appropriate function that is either uniformly integrable martingale
under a certain chosen optimal policy or a supermartingale under any other admissible
policy, with respect to the ltration Ft.
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Let (t) =
R t
s
(Yt)dt be a stochastic integral and let us introduce the following functional
process, which is a martingale with respect to the ltration Ft.
M(t; Yt) = exp((t))(Yt) +
Z t
0
exp((s))g(Ys)ds for t  0 (4.7)
Similarly to the study in Browne [10] we consider a reward function (Yt) which, for
a portfolio f , is dened by the equation below.
f (y) = Ey
h Z f
0
g(Yt) expf 
Z t
0
(Yt)dsgdt+ h(Yf ) expf 
Z f
0
(Yt)dsg
i
(4.8)
where  f is the rst escaping time of Y f (t) from a predetermined interval (l; u) with
l < Y (0) < u. There is also a non-negative function (Yt), and a bounded continuous
function g(Yt). There exist a function h(Yt) which takes l and u values such y = l or
y = u, with h(u) < 1. The value function (Yt) and the optimal portfolio f v (Yt) are as
follows:
(Yt) = supff (Yt): f 2 Ag;
f v (Yt) = argf supf(Yt) :f 2 Ag;
Where A is the set of admissible policies.
As demonstrated in Browne [10, Theorem 1] an optimal control vector fv(Yt) does exist,
and is of the form:
fv(Yt) =   1b (y(Yt))
Ytyy(Yt)
+ ( 1)0b: (4.9)
In the subsequent section we introduce the sharing rule parameter in order to analyse the
risk mitigation that might ensue from its presence in the model.
4.3 Analysis of the portfolio with respect to the
sharing rule
In this section, we analyse the impact of the parameter  which represents the sharing rule
between the fund manager and the contributor. With the introduction of the sharing rule
[54], the ratio function became: Xt=Gt and this determines the ratio process Yt which is
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a geometric Brownian motion because Xt and Gt are geometric Brownian motions.
The ratio is of the form:
bYt = Yt(r^t + (tf^t + ct))dt + ttdWt (4.10)
Finding the optimal control value of the terminal utility of the ratio process with the
presence the parameter , is analogous to the process without  with the only dierence
being the introduction of the  parameter. Thus we introduce  into the functional
martingale process given by the equation (4.7) giving the following:
M(t; bYt) = exp((t))(Yt) + Z t
0
exp((s))g(Ys)ds for t  0 (4.11)
Following the same reasoning as in the section (4.2) we have a reward function dened
in equation (4.8) and a stopping time given by  f which has an optimal control vector
given by the equation (4.9). With the introduction of the sharing rule the optimal control
solution vector of the equation (4.9) given in the equation (4.8) becomes:
fv(bYt) =    1b (y(Yt))
Ytyy(Yt)
+ ( 1)0b

: (4.12)
Now as we have the grasp of the impact of the introduction of the sharing rule parameter
, let us take a look at the notion of growth optimal portfolio (GOP) which is popularly
used in the world of nance.
4.4 Growth optimal portfolio
The notion of GOP has been widely used in the nancial industry and in the nancial lit-
erature since the work of Kelly (1956) [40]. Many authors have studied the growth optimal
portfolio such as Latane (1959) [43], Breiman (1960) [9], Thorp (1961) [55], Markowitz
(1976) [47] and Long (1990) [46], in gambling problems, portfolio optimization and the
pricing of derivatives. Authors such as Browne [10] and Heath and Platen (2006) [34] have
studied the GOP as the benchmarking model of portfolio optimisation. The GOP has the
characteristic of being the portfolio that maximises the expected log-utility from terminal
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wealth T , that is the quantity E[ln(VT )]. The GOP possesses also some other remarkable
properties. For instance, it maximises the expected growth rate over any time horizon.
It is also a strictly positive portfolio which almost surely outperforms any other strictly
positive portfolio over a suciently long time horizon [34]. Following the denition of the
GOP in the works of Heath and Platen [34], the GOP satises the following stochastic
dierential equation :
dVt = Vt

rtdt +
dX
k=1
kt (
k
t dt + dW
k
t )

: (4.13)
where kt denote the market price of the risk and it is represented by the equation.
kt =
dX
j=1
b 1t (t   rt): (4.14)
with b 1t being the inverse of the volatility matrix process, t is the appreciation rate
process and rt is the vector of the interest rate process. As shown in Browne [10] the
proportion of investment for the GOP is given by the equation 4.15 below:
 =  1b+ ( 1)0b: (4.15)
The following section will focus on the numerical and graphical analysis of the dierent
portfolios treated in the previous sections namely: the wealth process Xt, the guarantee
process Gt, the ratio process Yt and the GOP Vt.
4.5 Numerical and graphical illustration of the port-
folio.
In this section, we present a numerical and graphical comparative analysis of dierent
portfolios. We consider the wealth process, the guarantee, the growth optimal portfolio
and the ratio process. Computations have been made by calculating the values of these
portfolios. On the page 35 we have the graph Fig 4.1, illustrating the evolution of the
wealth process which is following the Browne's portfolio comparatively to the guarantee
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and the ratio. It can be seen on the graph how the ratio in green just evolve below the
wealth in blue with the same pattern but where the dierence is the guarantee in red as
it is the denominator of the ratio with respect to the wealth portfolio. The Table 4.2 on
the same page 35 correspond to the Fig 4.1 and it illustrates the numerical evolution of
wealth process, the guarantee, and the ratio process. On the page 36 we have the Fig
4.2 illustrating the stochastic evolution of wealth process, the guarantee, and the growth
optimal portfolio (GOP); and the Table 4.3 which contains the corresponding computed
values of the wealth process, the guarantee and the GOP. On the page 37 the Fig 4.3
illustrates the evolution of the guarantee, the wealth process and the ratio process where
we have introduced the parameter  which is the sharing rule [54]. It can be seen on the
graph that  does not change the pattern of the ratio but it diminishes its value, by doing
so it mitigates the risk by sharing it between the pension fund manager and the pension
fund member [19].
The graphs in Fig 4.1 and 4.2 on pages 35 and 36 show the stochastic evolution of the
wealth process, the guarantee, the ratio process and the growth optimal portfolio. As it
can be seen in these gures, the evolution of the guarantee is less volatile than the wealth
process and the growth optimal portfolio. The guarantee reach hardly negatives values
[19]. This is because of its state imposed positive constraint structure. The reading of
the Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 on pages 35 to 37 is quite interesting, especially observing how
the parameter  impacts on the values of the ratio process. This can be observed on the
computed values of the Table 4.4 on page 37 by looking at the value on the column Yt
and Zt = Yt. It can be spotted that the introduction of the sharing rule parameter is
mitigating the risk in the process; as the value of the surplus process with  comparatively
to the value of the surplus process without  is dwindling. It shows how the value of 
does impact the ratio process as it dwarfs its value comparing to the other portfolios.
The fact that the value of the ratio process is reduced shows how the risk is shared as
the return does diminish, going along with the theoretical reasoning which link returns to
risks [6]. The ratio process is positive when the values of the wealth process are over the
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guarantee's. The fund manager will always try to nd a combination of asset portfolio
that allows him to have a ratio that is positive.
The following Table contains num. value used to analyse the model under this disser-
tation with the Matlab Software.
Table 4.1: Num. value relative to Fig 4.1 to 4.12 and Tables 4.1 to 4.9
Symbols 11=22 12=21   1 2
Num. value 1 0 0:01 0:9 0:52 0:58
Symbols dt b1 b2 b3 alf c1
Num. value 1 0:15 0:25 0:5 0:4 0:41
Here  is the volatility,  is the drift,  is the sharing parameter, b1b2 b3 alf c1 are
coecients, dt is the dierential with respect to time.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the Ratio process vs the Wealth process.
Table 4.2: The wealth Xt, guarantee Gt, and ratio process Yt.
Time Xt Gt Yt
0 1:0000 1:0000 1:0000
10 1:0385 1:0254 1:0128
20 1:1109 1:0642 1:0439
30 1:1625 1:0889 1:0676
40 1:2373 1:1336 1:0915
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of the GOP process vs the Wealth process.
Table 4.3: The wealth Xt, guarantee Gt, and The GOP process Vt.
Time Xt Gt Vt
0 1:0000 1:000 1:0000
10 1:0322 1:0303 0:9968
20 1:0819 1:0615 1:0634
30 1:1128 1:0940 1:1409
40 1:0762 1:1313 1:2435
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the Wealth, Guarantee, Ratio with and without :
Table 4.4: The wealth Xt, guarantee Gt, ratio process Yt before sharing and Zt the ratio
after sharing with  = 0:9.
Time Xt Gt Yt Zt = (Yt)
0 1:0000 1:000 1:0000 0:0000
10 1:0313 1:0408 0:9998 0:0008
20 1:0284 1:0103 1:0018 0:0016
30 1:0339 1:0136 1:0245 0:0041
40 1:0408 1:0157 1:0159 0:0053
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4.6 Sensitivity analysis of the portfolio
The sensitivity analysis is a technique used to determine how a value of particular asset
is impacted by variations occurring to some factors in the market such interest rate, time,
volatility,... [37]. The sensitivity analysis is one of the means used by nancial institutions
to manage risk. Generally the measures used in sensitivity analysis are restricted with
the black-scholes parameters set and called as the Greeks [2]. The Greeks are:
 Delta (): is the rate of change of the value of the portfolio with respect to it market
value ( = @
@S
).
 Theta (): is the rate of change of the value of the portfolio with respect to time, it
often referred as the time decay ( = @
@T
).
 Gamma (): is the rate of change of the value of the portfolio's delta with respect
to market value of the portfolio ( = @
2
@S2
).
 Vega 1 (): is the rate of change of the value of the portfolio with respect to the
volatility of the portfolio (  = @
@
).
 Rho (): is the rate of change of the value of the portfolio with respect to the interest
rate ( = @
@r
).
In the present research, the focused is put on the level of the volatility of the Browne's
wealth portfolio (Xt), the ratio process (Yt), the guarantee (Gt) and the GOP (Vt). The
nancial theory states that the value of the portfolio is very sensitive to small changes in
volatility [37]. The graph Fig 4.4 on page 40 illustrates the rate of the variation of the
Wealth with respect the value of Vega (), it shows how volatile is the wealth portfolio
(Xt). It can be seen in the graph that any small variation of vega () impact the value of
the wealth portfolio; this is captured by the degree of the envelop of the curve. The graph
Fig 4.5 on page 40 illustrates how a combined analysis of the volatility of the Wealth
1it is worthwhile to notice that Vega is not a Greek letter, but the symbol  has been used as its
representation in the nance literature.
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process (Xt) following Browne portfolio, the Guarantee process (Gt), the Ratio process
(Yt) and the GOP (Vt) ( growth optimal portfolio) vary with respect of Vega. It can be
spotted that a little variation of vega () does signicantly aect the level of the portfolios
values. The degree of acutancy of the curve in graph as it goes along with vega's and
portfolios' values.
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4.7 Utility function of the portfolio
The present paragraph illustrates graphically and numerically the estimation of the power
utility function. Computations have been made, comparing the value of the power util-
ity function under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) of the pension fund manager
U(Zt) and of the pension fund members U(Zt), with each having its own pattern of risk
aversion. The literature on the utility function has shown that fund managers and fund
members have conicting patterns of risk aversion with the former tending to be less risk
averse than the latter [38]. The power utility function is of the form:
U(Yt) =
(Yt)
1 
1   with  6= 1 (4.16)
In Tables 4.5 to 4.8 we computed the utility values of the ratio process, of the share of the
pension fund manager as well as of the share of the pension fund member. In Table 4.5 on
page 42 we assigned a high value of coecient of risk aversion to both the pension fund
manager and the pension fund member. The nding is that when both are risk averse
their respective utility values are low. This goes along with the theoretical reasoning
which stipulate that risk aversion is inversely related to return [52] [57].
In Table 4.6 on page 42 a lower value of the coecient of risk aversion was assigned for
both the pension fund manager and the pension fund members. The outcome is that
the utility value for both are higher as the coecient of risk aversion is low [37]. In the
subsequent tables on page 43 which follow, the computation has been made by allocat-
ing either high or low the value of risk aversion for both the pension fund manager and
the pension fund members. In those tables the theoretical reasoning of risk aversion and
return does stand as well. The coecients of risk aversion on these tables are namely
 for the pension fund manager and  for the pension fund members. It is worthwhile
to note that the ratio process appearing in the tables and represented by Yt, has been
assigned the coecient  for the pension fund manager, only for the sake of comparative
analysis. Graphs in Fig 4.6 to 4.9 on pages 44 and 45 are related to Tables 4.5 to 4.8 .
The results illustrates even better how utility values are rising and dwindling inversely
with the coecient of risk aversion.
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Table 4.5: Utility value of the PF Manager ( = 0:85) and of PF Members ( = 0:85).
Time U(Yt) U(Zt) U(Zt)
0 0:000 0:0000 0:0000
10 2:9499 2:6978 0:4168
20 2:9562 2:7028 0:4176
30 2:9484 2:6962 0:4166
40 2:9447 2:6939 0:4162
Table 4.6: Utility value of the PF Manager ( = 0:3) and of PF Members ( = 0:3).
Time U(Yt) U(Zt) U(Zt)
0 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
10 5:5835 5:4095 2:7982
20 5:5821 5:4103 2:7987
30 5:5825 5:4109 2:7990
40 5:5823 5:4100 2:7985
42
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7: Utility value of the PF Manager( = 0:85) and of PF Members ( = 0:3).
Time U(Yt) U(Zt) U(Zt)
0 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
10 2:9509 2:6987 2:3116
20 2:9524 2:6986 2:3113
30 2:9494 2:6975 2:3110
40 2:9517 2:6993 2:3115
Table 4.8: Utility value of the PF Manager( = 0:3) and of PF Members ( = 0:85).
Time U(Yt) U(Zt) U(Zt)
0 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
10 5:5838 2:6978 0:4168
20 5:5849 2:7028 0:4176
30 5:5830 2:6962 0:4166
40 5:5850 2:6939 0:4162
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Figure 4.6: Evolution of the utility function of the fund manager with ;  = 0:85
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Figure 4.7: Evolution of the utility function of the fund manager with  = 0:3;  = 0:3
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Figure 4.8: Evolution of the utility function of the fund manager with  = 0:85;  = 0:3
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Figure 4.9: Evolution of the utility function of the fund manager with  = 0:3;  = 0:85
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4.8 The share of the pension fund manager
The present paragraph illustrates graphically and analyses numerically the share C of the
pension fund manager and the benet B of the pension fund member. As demonstrated
by Deelstra et al [19] the share of the pension fund manager is dened as C = Kt,
where Kt = Xt   Gt is the surplus process; and the benet of the pension fund member
is dened as B = Gt + (1   )Kt with (1   )Kt being the share of the pension fund
member. Computations have been made by calculating the values of the share C of the
pension fund manager, the surplus Kt and the benet B of the pension fund member.
Those values are provided by the Table 4.9 on page 47. They correspond to the graph
Fig 4.12 on page 49. The Table 4.10 on the page 47 provide the values of the surplus
process with dierent levels of  (1, 0.985, 0.95, 0.85) and we observed that the values
of the surplus process are dwindling with . The reduction of the value of the surplus
with the reduction of  is of the nancial importance as it suggest that the risk is shared
between the pension fund stakeholders namely the pension fund manager and the pension
fund member [19][54].
In the graph Fig 4.10 on the page 48 is the illustration of the evolution of the surplus
process with dierent levels of . The impact of this parameter is seen on the graph
by showing how the surplus process is lowering with the level of . The presence of the
parameter  in the surplus process illustrates how the risk is shared by pension funds
and their clients. This provides some guarantee to the pension fund member investment,
thus rendering the programme more attractive in the client investment point of view. The
graph in Fig 4.11 on page 48 illustrates the evolution of the share of the surplus process
of the pension fund manager C = Kt and of the pension fund member (1 )Kt. In the
graph we can see how the gap between pension fund managers and pension fund members
widen as years goes, it shows how the eect of  is felt by the two stakeholders of the
pension fund during the investment life. The graph in Fig 4.12 on page 49 illustrates the
evolution of the surplus process (Kt), the share of the pension fund manager (C = Kt)
and the benet of the pension fund member B = Gt + (1  )Kt.
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Table 4.9: Share of the PF Manager(C) and Benet of PF Members (B)
Time Surplus(Xt  Gt) C, Share of PF Manager B, benet of PF Member)
0 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
10 0:0764 0:0688 1:0482
20 0:1221 0:1099 1:0768
30 0:1261 0:1135 1:1138
40 0:1846 0:1661 1:1440
Table 4.10: Evolution of the surplus with dierent levels of 
Time Surp, = 1 Surp1, = 0:985 Surp2, = 0:950 Surp3, = 0:90 Surp4, = 0:85
0 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
10 0:0484 0:0477 0:0460 0:0436 0:0411
20 0:0966 0:0952 0:0918 0:0868 0:0821
30 0:1415 0:1394 0:1344 0:1274 0:1203
40 0:1706 0:1680 0:1620 0:1535 0:1450
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of the surplus with dierent levels of :
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The present dissertation presents an analysis of the problem of the optimal performance
measurement of a dened contribution pension fund scheme where we have introduced
two parameters: the guarantee and the sharing rule. The dened contribution pension
fund scheme has seen its importance increased in the last two decades and this is due to
its capacity of transferring risk to pension fund members. This has pushed most fund
managers to adopt the aforementioned pension fund scheme. The dened contribution
pension fund programme present a considerable advantage such as providing more benets
than the ever present programme of dened benet pension fund. This is due to the fact
that the DC pension fund scheme goes into the market and thus present the possibility
of returns which are deemed higher than of the DB pension fund plan. By the same
token, because it presents a possibility of a higher return, it bears with a higher risk as
well. This possibility of higher risk which is mostly borne by pension fund members, is its
downside. The question raised here is to nd means to solve this problem encountered in
the DC pension fund programme in order to mitigate the risk borne by the pension fund
contributor.
Two elements have been introduced as part of the solution to try to improve the
dened contribution pension fund plan; those element are the guarantee and the sharing
rule represented by the parameter . The research has aimed to analyse the impact of
these elements into the dened contribution programme, in the context benchmarking
50
 
 
 
 
model with minimum guarantee.
The numerical and graphical analysis have been conducted in order to measure the
impact of the two parameter on the evolution of the portfolio. It has for instance shown
that the introduction of the parameter  which represent the sharing rule, has contributed
to reduce the volatility of the portfolio, thus its risk; although this reduce the expected
return at the same time. The ideal here is that as the dened contribution is a marketable
pension fund programme, the introduction of the parameter  serves as a trade-o between
the pension fund member and the pension fund manager in terms of risk.
 The guarantee, unlike to the sharing rule's parameter  is a state imposed parameter,
which makes it quite dicult to the pension fund manager to have full control of
the variable. Nonetheless, nding a guarantee that gives an optimal benet to
the programme is paramount against the risk of running the pension fund plan in
loss. In Chapter 4, we have analysed the benchmarking model of pension fund
with minimum guarantee in the Browne's framework [10]. The nding is that the
parameter guarantee by its status of being state imposed, presents an incentive
element for pension fund members to embrace the dened contribution programme.
Thus pension fund members are almost sure of getting their investment back. This
limits the reckeless behavior of pension fund managers and make them more cautious
when entering in the nancial market.
 The sharing rule on the other hand is a variable mostly controlled by pension fund
managers. A comparative numerical and graphical analysis of the pension fund
programme with dierent level of the parameter  representing the sharing rule have
been conducted. The numerical analysis has shown in Chapter 4 that the volatility
of the portfolio does decrease with the sharing parameter . For the graphical
analysis the nding is that, although the portfolio without the sharing parameter
 present some return higher than the portfolio with the sharing parameter ; its
does not present any guarantee to the pension fund member due to the fact that
it does not mitigate the risk mostly borne by the the pension fund member. The
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present research has tried to confront the problem of the optimal sharing rule found
in the existing literature and it is shown that the parameter  is a trade-o between
pension fund managers and pension fund members in terms of risk mitigation. [19]
[54].
We have conducted a comparative analysis between the growth optimal portfolio (GOP)
with the guarantee process, the Browne's wealth process and the ratio process. The
sensitivity analysis of the portfolios have been also conducted. It has been found that our
portfolios are so sensitive to the market volatility as illustrated in graphs Fig 4.4 and Fig
4.5 on the page 40. We have also conducted a numerical analysis on the level of the utility
and its degree of risk aversion between the pension fund manager and the pension fund
member. The nding is that the level of the utility for both stakeholder evolve inversely
with the level of risk aversion [52]. Finally we have computed the share of the pension
fund manager and the benet of the pension fund member.
Concerning these issues of the guarantee and of the sharing rule, there are dierent
ways for taking it forward. So for instance one can use the tracking method to compare
the guarantee with other benchmark instruments such as the GOP.
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